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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20060254-CA

v.
DEON LOMAX CLOPTEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count each of
murder, a first degree felony; failure to respond to a police
officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony; and possession
or use of a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree
felony (R. 612-14).

This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal

pursuant to the pourover provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (j) (West 2004) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding

expert testimony on the deficiencies of eyewitness identification
where the court determined that the expert testimony would be
redundant in light of the cautionary eyewitness identification
instruction given to the jury?

"Whether expert testimony on the inherent deficiencies of
eyewitness identification should be allowed is within the sound
discretion of the trial court."

State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT

59, 1 43, 27 P.3d 1133; accord State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, 5 66,
44 P.3d 794 ("[t]he trial court has wide discretion in
determining the admissibility of expert testimony" on eyewitness
identification)(quoting State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361
(Utah 1993) ) .

An appellate court will not reverse a trial

court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony "^unless
the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability.'" Hollen, 2002
UT 35, 1 66 (quoting Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361).
2.

Can defendant prevail on an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim where he has failed to do more than baldly assert
that the outcome of his trial would likely have been different if
defense counsel had chosen a different strategy for impeaching a
prosecution witness?
3.

Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to request a

lesser included offense instruction where such an instruction
conflicted with his defense theory of mistaken identification?
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance
prejudiced defendant.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991).
This claim presents a question of law, reviewed on the record of

2

the underlying trial.

See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, M

16-17, 12 P.3d 92.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Rule of Evidence 403, governing exclusion of relevant
evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time,
provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count each of murder, a first
degree felony; obstructing justice, a second degree felony;
failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree
felony; and possession or use of a firearm by a restricted
person, a second degree felony (R. 1-2). At trial, after one
witness testified, defendant moved for a mistrial and the court
granted the motion (R. 448-49, R. 641). After a second trial, a
jury found defendant guilty of murder and failure to respond to
an officer's signal to stop, but acquitted him of obstructing
justice (R. 609-11).2

The trial court found defendant guilty of

the bifurcated charge of possession of a firearm by a restricted
person (R. 572-73).

The court sentenced defendant to five years

1

In his closing argument, defense counsel conceded that
defendant failed to respond to the officer's signal to stop (R.
660: 26).
3

to life in the Utah State Prison on the murder charge, zero to
five years on the failure to stop charge, and one to fifteen
years on the possession charge.

All sentences were ordered to

run consecutive to any other sentences defendant was serving at
the time.

In addition, the sentences for murder and possession

of a firearm were ordered to run consecutive to each other (R.
612-14) .

The court also ordered counseling and funeral costs for

the victim's family (R. 661: 18-20).

Defendant filed a timely

appeal (R. 615). The Utah Supreme Court poured the case over to
this Court (R. 622).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of December 1, 2002, Tony Fuailemaa and his
girlfriend, Shannon Pantoja, went to a concert in downtown Salt
Lake at Club X-Scape, where a rap group called Bone Thugs
Harmony was playing (R. 645: 31-32).

x

n

Based on the "nature of the

concert," four undercover police officers in plain clothes also
attended (Id. at 103-04).
As Shannon and Tony approached the club, Shannon saw a group
of four men standing by the entrance.

Shannon exchanged

greetings with one of the men on the way into the club (Id. at
34-35).

As she did so, defendant, also part of the group, turned

to look at her (Id. at 35, 64, 99). Once inside the club, Tony
asked Shannon if she knew "those guys."

He asked especially

about defendant, who was wearing a red sweatshirt and matching
red sweatpants and whom Tony described as "all flamed up" (Id. at

4

35-36, 65, 100).

Shannon told Tony she knew the man she had

greeted by sight but did not know defendant (Id. at 36).

Tony

told her defendant's name, asked her if she saw his face, and
commented that " x he had had some problems with some of the homies
out in the prison'" (Id. at 36, 66). Shannon and Tony then
picked up their tickets and went to the concert (Id. at 33-34).
Inside the venue, the four undercover officers "monitored
the crowd, watch[ing] for problems" (Id. at 107).

Detective Saul

Bailey pointed out Shannon, whom he knew, to Officer Jason
Mazuran (Id. at 110) .

Both noticed the man in all red and

thought he looked familiar, but neither could come up with his
name at the time (Id. at 105-06, R. 646: 210). Towards the end
of the concert, Officer Mazuran observed "some sort of
confrontation or tension" between the man in red's group and Tony
and Shannon (R. 645: 107-08).

Mazuran testified, "There appeared

to be a lot of tension between ^em, body language . . . that
indicated . . . the two groups were, you know — disliked each
other" (Id. at 110-11).

The confrontation ended when the two

groups "walked away from each other" (Id. at 111).
Just before the concert ended, Tony and Shannon decided to
leave to avoid the rush.

Walking east on 100 South from West

Temple, Shannon saw three of the four men from the group she had
seen outside the club before the concert.

She testified, "They

were kind of like hiding behind - crouched behind the building .
. . . They all three peeked out and then immediately ducked back

5

again.

So, to me, it was obvious they were up to something" (Id.

at 38).

Tony and Shannon stopped walking, and Tony said to her,

U,V

I think I'm going to have some problems with these guys'" (Id.

at 39). Although Shannon immediately suggested they go back to
the club, Tony refused, not wanting to appear to be "a punk" (Id.
at 39).
Just then, defendant stepped out from a recessed doorway
about ten feet away (Id. at 40, 72). With the hood of his red
sweatshirt pulled up over his head, he walked towards Tony.

His

arm was fully extended, and he held a small black handgun (Id. at
40, 43, 81). At very close range, defendant pulled the trigger,
shooting Tony in the head and neck (Id. at 143; R. 646A: 23,
30) .2

Tony dropped to the ground, Shannon began screaming, and

defendant, along with the three other men, ran east on 100 South
(Id. at 44, R. 646: 249). The medical examiner testified that the
shot to Tony's head was "[v]ery quickly lethal" (Id. at 645:
143) .
Detective Bailey turned the corner onto 100 South just after
the shots rang out (R. 645: 45-46/ R. 646: 194-95).

He

recognized Shannon and asked her "who did it" (R. 645: 46; R.
646: 195).

Shannon pointed east and answered, "It's the guy in

2

R. 646, part of the trial transcript, includes a
separately-numbered excerpt from the preliminary hearing
transcript. This excerpt, containing the testimony of an
unavailable eyewitness, Christopher Hamby, is physically appended
to the back cover of the trial transcript. The State will
reference the excerpt as "R. 646A."
6

all red" (R. 645: 46). Detective Bailey and another officer saw
a man dressed in red running away.
corner midway down the block.

The man in red turned a

The officers gave chase on foot

but had to slow down to check dark alcoves along the route for
safety (R. 646: 195-97).

The officers stopped where the man had

turned, which was a driveway entrance into a parking lot (Id. at
197) .
Detective Bailey testified that when he looked south into
the parking lot, he saw a white Ford Explorer heading towards
him, "accelerating pretty good through the parking lot,

I

stepped . . . out of the center of tl le driveway and stepped, back
onto the sidewalk to prevent being run over by the vehicle" (Id.
at 198; id., at- 201).

E 'roiti his sidewalk vantage point, Detective

Bailey identified the driver as defendant, the man in red whom he
had recognized earlier in the evening at the club but whose name
he could not recall (Id. at 198-99).

With his gun drawn and his

identification visible, Bailey "challenged the vehicle and
identified myself and ordered the driver to stop" (Id. at 199200).

Defendant paused, looked startled, and then "hit the

accelerator" (IcL. at 199, 201).
Meanwhile, Officer Mazuran had gone to reposition his
unmarked police car closer to the concert venue (R. 645: 112).
En route, he heard shots and drove in the direction of the sound.
Mazuran heard a woman screaming, saw a man on the ground, and saw
Detective Bailey running east (Id. at 115). After talking

7

briefly with Bailey, Mazuran continued driving east.

He

There was a parking lot to my right. And I
saw a vehicle coming at me at a high rate of
speed. The vehicle came out and almost hit
my passenger side rear end of the truck. And
I came to almost a complete stop.
The vehicle came out and came around my rear
end and came up parallel to me. So my
driver's side window was maybe 12, 16 inches
from their passenger side window.
My windows were rolled down. I looked to my
left and observed the defendant driving,
wearing the red suit. I immediately
recognized him. I observed another male
sitting next to him in the passenger side.
And we looked each other right in the face
right there in the middle of First South.
He had an expression of, somewhat of fear,
nervousness. We locked eyes, and I believed
that we were going to have a shooting right
in the middle of the street.
Id. at 116-17.

Officer Mazuran reached down, drew his gun, and

flipped on his red and blue lights (Id.).

As soon as the lights

went on, defendant's vehicle accelerated down the street (Id.).
Defendant turned north on Main Street, west on South Temple,
and north on 400 west, with Officer Mazuran chasing him at speeds
of up to 60 miles an hour (Id. at 118). As the vehicles
approached Beck Street and Victory Road, three marked police cars
joined the chase, driving at up to 100 miles an hour (Id. at 15051).

The pursuit continued onto 1-15 North, reaching speeds of

120 miles an hour (Id. at 153).

Defendant finally pulled over

near the 2600 South exit in Bountiful (Id. at 154).
8

Police conducted a felony stop of defendant and his three
passengers (Id. at 154-55).

Officers then contacted Detective

Bailey, who brought Shannon to the scene to see if she could
identify any of the four people in the vehicle (R. 645: 50; R.
646: 207-08).

En route, Shannon told Bailey that Deon Clopten

was the shooter (R. 645: 53; R. 646: 210). At the scene, Shannon
remained in the police car while each suspect was brought out
individually, in front of bright police lights (R. 645: 51; R,
646: 211).

Shannon immediately and unequivocal! y identified

defendant as the shooter (R. 645: 52-53; R. 646: 214-15). 3

She

identified the other three men -as those who had been wi th
defendant at the club earlier that evening (R. 645: 53-54; R.
646: 215-16).
Three other key witnesses testified.
attended the concert that night.

Melissa Valdez also

Standing in line outside the

club before the concert, she talked with a man in a group of
about four or five men about getting tickets (R. 646: 243-44).
Later, like Shannon and Tony, Melissa and her date left the
concert before it was quite over (Id. at 244). On the way back
to the parking lot, they passed a couple on the street, and
Melissa overheard them arguing about whether or not to return to
the club (Id. at 244-45).

Continuing east past the couple,

Melissa saw the same man she had talked to earlier about tickets

3

A little more than a year later, Shannon again
unequivocally identified defendant from an in-person lineup
conducted at the sheriff's office (R. 645: 57-58).
9

approach her, heading west (Id. at 246) .

He was wearing a red

sweatshirt with the hood pulled over his head and matching red
sweatpants.

Recognizing him from the earlier conversation, she

asked if had gotten into the club.
he passed by (Id. at 246-48).

The man responded, "yeah" as

Melissa testified that the man's

hands were in his sweatshirt pockets and "[h]e seemed very cold,
like he was a man with a mission" (Id. at 248).
Melissa and her date then came upon a man urinating against
a wall (Id. at 249).

Stepping over the resultant puddle, Melissa

happened to look over her shoulder.

At that moment, she heard a

gunshot and saw defendant standing behind the victim with his
right arm extended, holding what appeared to be a gun (Id. at
249, 268).

She began to run away.

After she heard several more

shots, the man who had been urinating and the man in red both ran
past her (Id. at 250-51).

Melissa reached the parking lot, met

up with her date, and they got in Melissa's car to leave.
Approaching the parking lot exit, Melissa realized that the
shooter was in the white Ford Explorer right in front of her,
along with three other men (Id. at 250, 266). 4

Later, when

presented with a photo array, Melissa twice identified defendant
as the shooter (Id. at 255-56) .

4

The man with whom Melissa attended the concert also
testified. Although reluctant to be involved in the case, he
corroborated all the essential details of Melissa's testimony.
See R. 647: 473-80, 483-87.
10

Christopher Hamby, another key witness, was unavailable to
testify at trial.

Consequent] y, hi s pre] 1 m i nary heari ng

testimony was read to the jury (R. 646: 319-20).

Hamby, who was

visiting :rom out-of-state, went with his brother and his
brother's two friends to the concert that night (Id. at 325).
One of his brother's friends was defendant.

Hamby testified

that, while they were in the club, the victim "ran up on"
defendant and they had a "commotion" (R. 646A: 21). Hamby
stated, "[T]he victim and victim friends or associates surrounded
Deon.

Then I guess it was some of Deon's associates surrounded

him ,

I seen it, but it didn't r^all. / I > • «a 1

They just all spread around and separated" (Id.).
"[I]t was just a big commotion.

IMA/TI

t :> no fight.

Hamby added,

It wasn't no angry-type

situation" (Id^ at 22).
Hamby testified that he, his brother, defendant, and another
man named Freddie White left the concert early and returned to
their vehicle.

Hamby testified:

We was going to the "Jeep." And when we got
around the corner, [defendant] seen the guy,
the victim. . . . And we walked on to the
Jeep.
[W]e was in the Jeep getting to
leave . . . [and] Deon said, "I'm goin' to
shoot him," in the angry manner. And he told
Freddie to, "Hand me the gun." So Freddie
handed him the gun.
And everybody got out of the Jeep and walked
back down. And he walked up on him close
and, at point-blank range, he shot him in the
back of the head.

11

(R. 646A: 23). Hamby also testified that defendant "threw on"
the hood of his red sweatshirt when he was several feet away from
the victim and that, as they were fleeing in the car after the
shooting, defendant, who was driving, passed his gun to Freddie
"and told him to throw it out [the window] and he threw it out"
(Id. at 29, 33, 34) .5
Finally, the State called Robert Land to testify.

Land knew

defendant from the state prison system, where they had been
cellmates in the 1990fs (R. 646: 342). Land also knew Tony, the
victim, from the Timpanogos section of the prison, colloquially
known as "288" (Id. at 345). According to Land, some years
earlier, two other inmates had been fighting with defendant in
288, when defendant "started to get the better of the two" (Id.
at 348). Tony, who had not been involved in the fight,
intervened and hit defendant, thus ending the altercation (Id. at
348-49) .

Land testified that defendant held a grudge against

Tony for his interference and, since the event, had considered
him an "enemy" (Id. at 349, 351).
Land met up again with defendant in December of 2002, when
defendant was incarcerated for this offense (Id. at 343). Land

5

A man bicycling from Salt Lake to Bountiful on the night
of the murder found two handguns in the gutter on Beck Street (R.
645: 161-62). He secreted them in a bush and called the police
the next day (Id. at 163). The state firearms examiner testified
that the bullet casings found at the scene of the shooting came
from the 9mm handgun found on Beck Street and that the bullet
fragments found in the victim''s body were consistent with the
same weapon (R. 646: 379, 380).
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testified that defendant told him that he had seen
club on

Tony at the

: night of 1:1: le concert and that Tony had said to him,

"Do you remember 288?" (Id. at 346). Land stated that defendant
"told [Tony], You better go call

[your] mom because that's the

last time [you'll] talk to her" (Id.),

Land further stated that

defendant told him he "domed" Tony, which Land explained meant to
"shoot him in the head" (Id. at 352) .

Defendant also told Laiid

that they threw the guns out the window while fleeing by car
towards Ogden (Id. at 353).
The defense case rested on trying to introduce reasonable
doubt that defendant was the shooter,

TI: ie defense argued that

either defendant or Freddie White, another passenger in the
vehicle, could have been the shooter.

Defendant's two sisters

both testified that Freddie White told them that he was the
shooter (R. 647: 491-93; 497, 501). They said that Brandon,
Christopher Hamby's brother, was supposed to do the shooting, but
that he became scared when the gun jammed, and that Freddie White
did it instead (Id. at 491, 501). A third witness, a close
friend of one of the sisters, testified that Freddie White told
her that defendant was not the shooter and implied that he had
pulled the trigger (Id. at 505-06, 511). She also told an
investigator that Freddie White did the shooting after Brandon's
gun jammed (Id. at 523).
Additionally, this third witness told the investigator that
Freddie White was wearing a red hooded sweatshirt on the night of

13

the killing (Id. at 523). 6

For corroboration, the defense relied

on the testimony of a man and woman staying on the 11th floor of
the Marriott Hotel in a room overlooking 100 South (R. 646: 302).
These witnesses testified that a man wearing a red jacket got in
the passenger side of the getaway car (Id. at 304-05, 312-13).
This testimony dovetailed with the testimony of Christopher
Hamby, who was in the vehicle that night and who stated that
Freddie White was on the passenger side of the vehicle (R. 646A:
27) .7
Citing Freddie White's alleged confession, the statement of
the sister's friend to the investigator that Freddie White was
wearing a red sweatshirt that night, and the observations of the
Marriott Hotel guests that a man clad in a red jacket got in the
passenger side of the getaway car, defense counsel argued that
reasonable doubt existed that defendant was the shooter.
The jury deliberated for just under three hours.

It

convicted defendant of murder and failure to respond to an
officer's signal to stop and acquitted him of obstructing justice
(R. 660: 63-64).

The court found defendant guilty of the

6

A red hooded sweatshirt was found in the getaway vehicle.
Officers did not seize it, however, because the clothing worn by
the suspects when the vehicle was stopped matched the
descriptions given by the witnesses at the scene of the killing
(R. 646: 297). Moreover, Christopher Hamby corroborated that no
one took off or put on a sweatshirt in the car after the shooting
(R. 646A: 38).
7

Multiple witnesses agreed that defendant was the driver
and, thus, not on the passenger side of the vehicle (R. 645: 117,
156; R. 646: 198; R. 646A: 18, 27; R. 647: 523).
14

bifurcated charge of possession of a firearm by a restricted
person (Id.

66).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Defendant first" argues that the trial court erred as a
matter of law when it excluded expert testimony on eyewitness
identification.

At the outset, defendant advocates a standard of

review that does not and should not apply to expert eyewitness
identification testimony.

Under the proper abuse of discretion

standard, the trial court's ruling to exclude the testimony
because it was redundant in light of a cautionary instruction on
the difficulties with eyewitness identification was not beyond
State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, 1

the "limits of reasonability."
66, 44 P.3d 794.

And, contrary to defendant/ s assertions, •

cautionary instruction given by the trial court was adequate on
its face.

In any event, defendant approved the instruction and

so invited any subsequent error.

Finally, defendant has made no

showing that the excluded testimony would have made any
difference to the outcome of his trial.
Defendant next argues that his counsel was ineffective for
not investigating the terms of a prosecution witnes-

federal

plea agreement and then using the results of that investigation
to impeach the witness.

This argument fails because defense

counsel explored the terms of the federal plea agreement, found
it irrelevant, and so chose other means to impeach the witness.
A lawyer's choice of trial strategy that does not produce the
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desired result does not constitute ineffective assistance.

The

claim also fails because defendant's assertion of prejudice is
purely speculative.
Finally, defendant argues that his counsel performed
ineffectively by failing to request a lesser included offense
instruction on manslaughter.

This argument fails because

requesting such an instruction would have undermined the central
defense theory of mistaken identity.

Defendant argued that he

was not the person who committed the crime.

To request a

manslaughter instruction would concede that he was the shooter.
Because not requesting such an instruction was strategically
sound in light of the articulated defense of mistaken identity,
defendant did not perform deficiently.
of prejudice is speculative.

Moreover, his assertion

For both reasons, his claim fails.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS
DISCRETION IN EXCLUDING EXPERT
TESTIMONY ON EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION WHERE IT DETERMINED
THAT THE EXPERT'S LIMITED TESTIMONY
WOULD BE REDUNDANT AND CONFUSING
AND WHERE IT GAVE AN ADEQUATE
CAUTIONARY JURY INSTRUCTION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred as a matter of
law when it excluded expert testimony on eyewitness
identification.

See Br. of Aplt. at 12-15.

In his view, because

the cautionary Long instruction, which warns juries of the
16

dangers

inherent

sufficiently

in e y e w i t n e s s

identification,

failed

to

i n f o r m the jury about key p e r c e p t u a l p r o b l e m s in the

e v i d e n c e , the e x p e r t

should h a v e b e e n a l l o w e d to t e s t i f y

r e m e d i a t e the d e f i c i e n c y . 8

Id. at 1 8 - 2 0 .

Defendant's

to

argument

fails b e c a u s e he a d v o c a t e s a standard of r e v i e w that does n o t
s h o u l d not a p p l y to expert e y e w i t n e s s
U n d e r the c o r r e c t

identification

testimony.

s t a n d a r d of r e v i e w , the t r i a l c o u r t ' s

fell w e l l w i t h i n t h e " l i m i t s of r e a s o n a b i l i t y . "
2002 UT 3 5 , 5 66, 44 P. 3d 7 9 4 ,

decision

State v. H o l l e n ,

M o r e o v e r , by approvii lg tl le jury':.'.

i n s t r u c t i o n s , d e f e n d a n t w a i v e d any o b j e c t i o n to the s p e c i f i c s
the cautionary

eyewitness

Defendant's argument

identification

defendant's

first and second t r i a l s .

the
Before

first t r i a l , a f t e r a h e a r i n g on the S t a t e ' s m o t i o n

e x c l u d e e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y on e y e w i t n e s s
i s s u e d the f o l l o w i n g w r i t t e n

of

ii isti: action .

grows out of d e c i s i o n s m a d e b y

t r i a l court d u r i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s

and

i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , the

to

court

ruling:

T h e P l a i n t i f f ' s M o t i o n in L i m i n e : Dr. Dodd's
T e s t i m o n y , is g r a n t e d .
Dr. Dodd's t e s t i m o n y
is e x c l u d e d .
Dr. Dodd's t e s t i m o n y w i l l not
r e l a t e to s p e c i f i c facts of this case - has
not interviewed witnesses.
Testimony will
c a u s e c o n f u s i o n for the jury and w o u l d
i n f r i n g e u p o n p r o v i n c e of jury to judge
credibility.
A l l of the factors as [sic]
a d e q u a t e l y c o v e r e d in Long i n s t r u c t i o n .

8

Defendant also argues that the expert's testimony fell
within the plain language of rule 702, governing expert witness
testimony. See Br. of Aplt. at 15-17. The trial court, however,
made clear that the witness's qualification as an expert was not
at issue. Rather, the pivotal question was whether the expert's
testimony would be helpful and, if so, how far it should go. See
R. 637: 6; R. 638: 32, 37.
17

R. 474.

Less than a week later, the court reversed its decision,

stating, "I am going to let [Dr. Dodd] testify in very limited
circumstances.
this case.

Again, there will be no specifics in regards to

There will be nothing drawing any conclusions in

regards to this case, he will not be able to invade the province
of the jury in any way" (R. 640:7).

Soon thereafter, for

unrelated reasons, the court declared a mistrial (R. 448-49).
Nine months later, in a pretrial hearing before defendant's
second trial, the court once again considered the matter of
expert testimony about eyewitness identification:
The Court's preliminary ruling now, and as
I've notified you, is now to exclude Dr.
Dodd's testimony. It's the Court's decision
that case law totally leaves that to the
discretion of the Court. And I think the
eyewitness identification instruction does an
adequate job. And I think that Dr. Dodd's
testimony at this point would only confuse
the issue.

{T]he record should reflect that the Court at
one point was going to exclude Dr. Dodd's
testimony. Then I reviewed the decision.
Then I said that he would be allowed to
testify in a limited fashion.
And, since the delay in the trial and the
setting of the new trial, the Court has
reconsidered that position and decided that
Dr. Dodd's testimony is just superfluous and
would have no bearing on the jury's decision.
All he would be able to do is testify to
exactly what . . . the Long instruction
states to the jury with regards to eyewitness
identification.

{T]he court's ruling was that Dr. Dodd could
testify only to exactly what the Long
18

instruction gives. And I think it's
redundant. And I think the Long instruction
does a better job of explaining that.
R. 644: 12-14.
Highlighting the court's change of mind, defendant argues
that the abuse of discretion standard for reviewing whether
eyewitness identification testimony is admissible has produced
arbitrary and capricious results.

See Br. of Aplt. at 14-15.

That is, before the first trial, the court admitted the expert
testimony, albeit on a limited basis.

After a mistrial and

before the second trial, however, the court excluded the same
evidence.

In defendant's view, "[s]uch contrasting rulings

cannot both be correct'' (Id. at 15) .
If correction of error had been the applicable standard of
review, then defendant's reasoning might be sound.

Abuse of

discretion, however, is a more expansive standard.

Under it, an

appellate court will reverse a decision to admit or exclude
expert testimony only if " x the decision exceeds the limits of
reasonability.'"
P.2d at 1361).
xx

Hollen, 2002 UT 35, 1 66 (quoting Larsen, 865
The discretion exercised by the trial court

^necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the

appellate court can properly find abuse only if . . . no
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial
court.'"

See State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 1 28, 48 P.3d 953

(quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978))
(brackets in original).

Stated another way, "the appellate court
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must uphold the trial court's ruling if it was within the zone of
reasonable disagreement."

Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540,

542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Pursuant to this standard, two judges presented with the
same facts could rationally decide the same matter differently.
Neither decision would be reversed on appeal unless "no
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial
court."

Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 1 28 (citations omitted).

Similarly, a single judge could reconsider a matter between
trials, change positions, and also be affirmed on appeal, so long
as the outcome remained within the bounds of reasonability.
In the context of eyewitness identifications, whenever a
court addresses a request to admit expert testimony, the court is
faced with a dilemma.
P.3d 953.

State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 1 15, 48

If the court "[p]ermit[s] &n expert witness, either

directly or indirectly, to analyze the credibility of a
percipient witness for the jury," the expert, to some extent,
"steps into the province of the jury."

Id.

On the other hand,

if the court excludes expert testimony "about the limitations
inherent in eyewitness identifications, the jury might not be
educated about the potential deficiencies of eyewitness
identification."

Id.

Here, the court struggled with the dilemma.

Its ruling at

the first trial admitted the expert evidence, but did so on a
limited basis.

The expert could not testify about specifics of
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the case, could not draw any conclusions, and could not in any
way invade the province of the jury (R. 640: 7 ) . Before the
second trial, the court reconsidered and decided not to admit the
expert testimony at all.

The court reasoned that the expert's

testimony would be so limited as to add nothing to the Long
instruction.

Therefore, because it would simply be redundant,

the court excluded it.

These two rulings - one to admit on a

very limited basis and one to exclude —

are closely related.

While different, both outcomes plainly fall within the zone of
reasonability.

Where the trial court articulated its reasons for

ultimately excluding the testimony, it cannot be said that "no
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial
court."

Butterfield, 2001 UT 59 at 1 28 (quoting Gerrard, 584

P.2d at 887).
Defendant also argues that the Long instruction was
inadequate and thus required supplementation by the expert
witness.

Specifically, he claims that the expert's testimony

would have explained "how the stress of an event influences the
ability to remember facial features," how "a weapon detracts from
a person's ability to remember specific facial features," and
"the unreliability of cross-racial identification" (Br. of Aplt.
at 19-20).
First, the instruction did tell the jury that it "should
consider whether the capacity of the witness was impaired by . .
stress or fright at the time of observation" (R. 595 at
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addendum A ) .

Second, while the instruction did not make specific

mention of the impact of a weapon on eyewitness perception, it
did caution the jury to consider "the presence or absence of
distracting . . . activity during the observation" (R. 594 at
addendum A ) .

Third, the cautionary instruction specifically

provided that the jury should consider "whether the witness is of
a different race than the criminal actor.

Identification by a

person of a different race may be less reliable than
identification by a person of the same race" (R. 595).
The Long instruction is thus adequate on its face.

But even

assuming, arguendo, that the instructions did not fully cover all
of the relevant factors, defendant invited any alleged error.
The record reflects that the court gave defense counsel the
opportunity to offer "any exceptions or objections to the Jury
Instructions as proposed by the Court" (R. 647: 527).

Defense

counsel objected to the giving of only one instruction, not
relevant here (Id.).

Under such circumstances, he cannot now

complain that the instructions were inadequate.

See State v.

Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, 1 54, 70 P.3d 111 (refusing to address a
challenge to a jury instruction approved by defendant).
Moreover, defendant did not avail himself of the opportunity
to argue how each of the factors could have affected the
perceptions and reliability of individual eyewitnesses.

While

defense counsel referred to the cautionary instruction in his
closing argument, he stated only that "it's a really helpful
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instruction" and that "it's very detailed as to the
considerations you should take into your deliberations when you
decide and are evaluating the testimony of the eyewitnesses" (R.
660: 27). Where defendant neither objected to the cautionary
instruction nor used it to argue the specifics of his case, he
cannot now be heard to complain that it was inadequate.
Defendant's argument fails for an additional reason.

The

Utah Supreme Court has held:
[A] trial court's determination that expert
testimony would amount to a lecture to the
jury as to how they should judge the evidence
and its subsequent refusal to admit such
testimony into evidence xis not an abuse of
discretion, particularly where there has been
no showing that the excluded evidence would
probably have had a substantial influence in
bringing about a different verdict."
Butterfield, 2001 UT 59 at 5 43 (quoting State v. Malmrose, 649
P.2d 56, 61 (Utah 1982)); accord Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 1 20.
Here, defendant has made no showing that the excluded testimony
would have made any difference to the outcome of his trial.
Indeed, defendant's appellate argument wholly ignores the
testimony of two key witnesses, Melissa Valdez and Christopher
Hamby.

Melissa talked with defendant both before the concert,

while she was standing in line outside the venue, and after the
concert, as she was walking back to her car.

She recognized

defendant from the conversation before the concert when she
crossed paths with him after the concert.
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In both instances, she

was under no stress and saw no weapons.9

Moments after the post-

concert encounter, she heard a shot, turned around, and saw
defendant standing behind the victim with his right arm extended,
holding what appeared to be a gun (R. 646: 249).

She later

identified defendant from a photo array as the shooter (Id. at
255, 258) .

While Melissa was likely stressed when she turned

around and saw defendant with the gun, the same plainly cannot be
said of her two earlier, purely social interactions, on which her
identification of defendant was based.
Defendant also ignores the testimony of Christopher Hamby,
who knew defendant, accompanied him on the night of the killing,
and unequivocally maintained that defendant was the shooter (R.
646A: 23, 30; R. 646: 327). Hamby' s testimony that defendant was
the shooter did not involve a stranger identification and did not
require a cautionary eyewitness identification jury instruction,
much less expert testimony on the problems inherent in eyewitness
identifications.

His testimony was subject only to a credibility

determination and, as long as the jury believed him, the jury
could convict.
Defendant also ignores the testimony of Officers Mazuran and
Bailey who, while they did not witness the actual shooting, both
recognized defendant at or near the scene, saw him running away
and, moments later, encountered him again at close range as he

9

As to cross-racial identification, the record does not
reveal Melissa's ethnicity.
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drove out of a nearby parking lot.

These officers and others

visually tracked defendant's vehicle to the place on 1-15 where
the high-speed chase finally ended.

Moreover, the testimony of

Officer Bailey dovetailed with the testimony of Melissa Valdez,
Christopher Hamby, and Shannon Pantoja.
Thus, defendant has failed to demonstrate how the excluded
testimony "would probably have had a substantial influence in
bringing about a different verdict." Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 1
43 (citation omitted).

The trial court, therefore, did not abuse

its discretion in excluding the expert testimony as "redundant,"
"confusing," and "superfluous" (R. 644: 12-14).
POINT TWO
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON A CLAIM
OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE WHERE HIS
COUNSEL EXERCISED SOUND TRIAL
STRATEGY AND WHERE DEFENDANT HAS
ONLY BALDLY ASSERTED THAT THE
VERDICT WOULD LIKELY HAVE BEEN
DIFFERENT IF COUNSEL HAD CHOSEN A
DIFFERENT IMPEACHMENT STRATEGY
Defendant argues that his trial counsel's performance was
constitutionally ineffective because he did not "investigat [e]
and obtain[] proof of a federal plea agreement relating to Robert
Land, a key prosecution witness who claimed the defendant
confessed to the shooting."

Br. of Aplt. at 11.

Defendant

claims that had his counsel uncovered "what truly occurred" in
the federal sentencing proceeding, he could have used that
information to impeach Robert Land's testimony in this state
court proceeding.

Id. at 24. Absent such impeachment, he
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concludes, Land's testimony—detailing defendant's motive for the
killing and his confession to the crime—prejudiced the outcome of
the trial.

Id.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant must carry the burden of demonstrating "(1) that
counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for [the]
deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial would have been different."

State v. Cruz,

2005 UT 45, 5 38, 122 P.3d 543 (quotations omitted); see also
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

As to

deficient performance, a reviewing court "indulge[s] a strong
presumption" that trial counsel's performance comes within the
wide ambit of "reasonable professional assistance."
Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997).

State v.

As long as defense

counsel has a rational, articulable basis upon which to act,
deficient performance will not be found.

State v. Tennyson, 850

P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993).
Defendant's argument for ineffective assistance is premised
on establishing a significant link between this case and a
federal case in which Land received a reduced sentence in
exchange for revealing information about several criminal
matters, including this one.

Defendant argues generally that,

had his counsel obtained the sealed records from Land's federal
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case, he could have used the terms of the federal plea bargain t
impeach Land's testimony in this case.
Here, defense counsel thoroughly explored the federal
proceeding as a possible source of impeachment in the state case
On cross-examination of Robert Land, defense counsel introduced
transcript of a meeting that had occurred in connection with the
federal case (R. 646: 359-60).

Robert Land had been charged

under RICO and was facing a potential life sentence in federal
prison (Id. at 360). When the meeting occurred, Land's counsel
had already bargained down to 15 years in exchange for Land's
testimony in the RICO case and was seeking an even lower
sentence.

Present at the "debriefing" meeting were Land, his

federal attorney, an FBI agent, and a U.S. Attorney (Id. at 361,
366).

Land testified in this case that the FBI agent in the

federal case
had told me basically to lay out - that was
part of the plea agreement - as to anything
that I know to that [federal] case or
anything else, basically anything that I
know, to lay it out there. Because if I
don't, then basically - you know, if I'm not
truthful with them, then all it's going to do
is make it worse for me.
(Id. at 366).

In this context, Land told the federal personnel

what he knew about the murder involving Deon Clopten (Id. at 366
67).
On cross examination in this case, defense counsel further
pursued the matter, inquiring into the sentence reduction
resulting from Land's testimony in the RICO case:
27

Def. counsel;

The judge made that decision
after the government filed a
motion in your favor asking
for that reduction, right?
Putting that agreement out to
the judge saying, This is what
we recommend, the government
did?

Robert Land:

They filed a motion for me to
testify in federal court.

Def. counsel:

They filed a motion asking
that your sentence be reduced,
right?

Robert Land:

Yes, for testifying in federal
court.

Def. counsel:

And it was reduced.

Robert Land:

Yes, it was.

Def. counsel:

The government recommended
eight years?

Robert Land:

No.

Def. counsel;

How much did the government
recommend?

Robert Land:

They recommended ten years,
but the judge gave me -

Def. counsel:

The judge gave you eight.

Robert Land:
Def. counsel:

- eight years.
But that was still better than
the 15 they were recommending,
right?

Robert Land:

Yes.

Id. at 370-71.

This testimony clearly establishes that Robert

Land received a benefit in his federal sentence for testifying in
the RICO case.

As part of that plea bargain, Land told federal
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officers what he knew about other criminal activities, including
what defendant told him in prison about this case.

As defense

counsel fully explored, however, the federal case had no
relationship to the state murder case.

When Robert Land

testified in this case, he had already received the benefit of a
reduced sentence in the federal case.

The federal sentence,

having already been imposed, was not in any way contingent upon
what he testified to in this state case.

The two matters, as

defense counsel established, were wholly unrelated.

Counsel thus

did not perform deficiently by not pursuing the sealed federal
records because he had no reason to do so.

The benefit Land

received was undisputed and had nothing to do with Land's
testimony in state court.
Moreover, defense counsel did not ignore the issue of
impeaching Robert Land.

Indeed, counsel called two witnesses for

the specific purpose of impeachment.

First, counsel called

Miguel Florez, Land's cousin and cellmate, who testified that
Land and defendant did not get along and had no reason to talk to
each other in prison (R. 647: 460).

Second, counsel called Dejon

Waldron, defendant's cellmate after the shooting.

Waldron

testified that when defendant became his cellmate, he told
defendant that he was hostile towards Land and did not associate
with him (Id. at 466). He also testified that, under the highly
restricted conditions of maximum security, he never saw defendant
and Robert Land talking together (Id.).
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Counsel used this

testimony to impeach Robert Land's testimony that defendant
confessed to him in prison.
The law is well-settled that "[a]

lawyer's legitimate

exercise of judgment in the choice of trial strategy that does
not produce the anticipated result does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel."

State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d

667, 672 (Utah App. 1988)(citing Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d
1101, 1109 (Utah 1983); State v. McNicolf 554 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah
1976)).

Because a rational basis existed for not pursuing sealed

federal court documents and because counsel chose to impeach
Robert Land's testimony by directly questioning others who were
in prison with defendant at the time he confessed, counsel did
not perform deficiently.

See Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 468 (assuming

counsel's competence where rational basis for attorney
performance can be articulated) .
Defendant's ineffectiveness claim also fails for lack of
prejudice.

To prevail on this prong, defendant must demonstrate

that "but for the error, there [would be] a reasonable
probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to
the defendant."

State v. Dunnr 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993).

Defendant's argument falls well short of the mark.
First, defendant's claim of prejudice fails because it is
purely speculative.

He has not explained what was in the federal

sentencing records or how they would have helped him prevail.

He

has not explained how he thinks the terms of the federal sentence
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differed from what Land testified to in state court, how those
unspecified terms would have made Land's testimony in the state
case any less credible, or how Land's testimony served as the
linchpin of the conviction.

"On many occasions, this court has

reiterated that proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot
be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality."
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993).

Because

defendant has produced nothing but a speculative claim of
prejudice, his ineffective assistance claim fails.
Second, even assuming arguendo that Land's testimony about
defendant's confession and the motive for the killing had been
successfully impeached, other evidence amply supported the jury's
verdict.

Shannon Pantoja witnessed the murder, identified

defendant, and testified at trial.

Melissa Valdez saw defendant

with his arm outstretched, pointing the gun at the victim's head
and, moments later, running away. Christopher Hamby was with
defendant all evening and witnessed the murder.

Two police

officers placed defendant on the scene, saw a man dressed all in
red flee from the scene and, moments later, identified defendant
as he drove away from the scene.

This evidence rendered Robert

Land's testimony about the confession cumulative.

And, while no

one else testified about motive, motive is not a necessary
element of the crime.

Thus, even absent Robert Land's testimony,

in light of the overwhelming evidence that defendant was the
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shooter, there is no reasonable likelihood that the verdict would
have been different.
POINT THREE
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE
FOR FAILING TO REQUEST A LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION WHERE
SUCH AN INSTRUCTION CONFLICTED WITH
HIS DEFENSE THEORY OF MISTAKEN
IDENTIFICATION
Defendant argues that his counsel performed deficiently by
failing

NN

to request a manslaughter instruction as a lesser

included offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder, a 1st degree
felony."

Br. of Aplt. at 25.

He contends that if the court left

the credibility of the witnesses entirely to the jury, then the
evidence as to whether the crime committed was manslaughter or
murder should have gone to the jury.

Id. at 26.

Defendant makes

no separate showing of how this allegedly deficient performance
prejudiced the outcome of his trial.
Defendant's claim fails on both prongs of the
ineffectiveness analysis.

As to deficient performance, the law

is well-settled that "when counsel has failed to take a
particular action, a [reviewing court] must determine whether
such failure was justified by tactical or other considerations."
State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Utah 1988).

Here, the

defense theory was mistaken identity—that Freddie White, not
defendant, was the shooter.
manslaughter instruction.

Such a defense conflicted with a
To request such an instruction would

have been akin to asserting, "My guy didn't shoot the victim, but
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if he did, he only committed manslaughter."

Had defense counsel

asserted such a position, he plainly would have undermined the
primary defense that defendant was not the person who committed
the crime.10

Because not requesting a manslaughter instruction

was strategically sound in light of the mistaken identity theory
on which defendant relied, defense counsel did not perform
deficiently.

Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225.

Defendant's claim may alternatively be disposed of for
failure to demonstrate that, but for his counsel's allegedly
deficient performance, he would have enjoyed a reasonable
probability of a better trial outcome.
P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996).

State v. Arquelles, 921

Here, defendant simply asserts

prejudice, without offering any supporting explanation or
argument.

The law is well-settled that a conclusory proclamation

of prejudice cannot establish prejudice as a demonstrable
reality.

Id.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction on one count each of murder, a first degree felony;
10

Indeed, even in this appeal, reflecting the evidence
adduced at trial, defendant's appellate counsel aptly described
the crime as "an execution type shooting." Br. of Aplt. at 5.
Counsel stated that "[the victim] was shot at close range in the
head. The State's theory was that the shooter was [defendant].
The defense theory was that the shooter was Freddie White." Id.
The only disputed factual issue in this case, both in the trial
court and on appeal, was the identity of the shooter. No one
asserted at any juncture in the proceedings that this was
anything but a murder.
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failure to respond to a police officer's signal to stop, a third
degree felony; and possession or use of a firearm by a restricted
person, a second degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this \H__ day of January, 2008.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

INSTRUCTION NO. J i

f\

An important question in this case is the identification of the defendant as the person who
ommitted the crime. The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, not
nly that the crime wras committed, but also that the defendant was the person who committed
ie crime. If, after considering the evidence you have heard from both sides, you are not
onvinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the crime,
ou must find the defendant not guilty.
The identification testimony that you have heard was an expression of belief or
npression by the witness. To find the defendant not guilty, you need not believe that the
ientification witness was not insincere, but merely that the witness wras mistaken in his or her
elief or impression.
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification.

In considering whether the

rosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who
ommitted the crime, you should consider the following:
1.

Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe the criminal actor? In

nswering this question, you should consider:
(a)

the length of time the witness observed the actor;

(b)

the distance between the witness and the actor;

(c)

the light or lack of light at the place and time of observation

(d)

the presence or absence of distracting noises or activity during the
observation;

(e)

any other circumstance affecting the opportunity of the witness to observe
the person committing the crime.

(f)

the extent to which the actor's features were visible and undisguised.

S^M

2.

Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person committing the crime? In

answering this question, you should consider whether the capacity of the witness was impaired
by:

3.

(a)

stress or fright at the time of observation;

(b)

personal motivations, biases or prejudices;

(c)

fatigue or injury.

(d)

uncorrected visual defects.

Whether the witness is of a different race than the criminal actor. Identification

by a person of a different race may be less reliable than identification by a person of the same
race.
4.

Was the identification of the defendant by the witness completely the product of

the witness' own memory? In answering this question, you should consider:
(a)

the length of time that passed between the original observation of the
witness and the identification of the defendant by the witness;

(b)

the mental capacity and state of mind of the witness at the time of the
identification:

(c)

the exposure of the witness to opinions, to photographs, or to any other
information or influence that may have affected the independence of the
identification of the defendant by the witness;

(d)

any instance when the witness failed to identify the defendant;

(e)

any instances when the witness gave a description of the actor that is
inconsistent with the defendant's appearance;

(f) the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to the witness for
identification.

w
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You may take into account that an identification made by picking the defendant from a
group of similar individuals is generally more reliable that an identification made from the
defendant being presented alone to the witness.
You may also take into account that identifications made from seeing the person are
generally more reliable that identifications made from a photograph.
If, after considering the evidence you have heard from the prosecution and from the
defense, and alter evaluating the eyewitness testimony in light of the considerations listed above,
you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the
crime charged, and you find all of the other elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt,
you must find the defendant guilty of the crime charged.
If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was the person who committed the crime charged you must find the defendant not guilty of the
crime charged.

